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REVOLUTION OR EVOLUTION
IN GUSTAV RADBRUCH'S
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
Erik Wolf
SINcE GUSTAV RADBRUCH'S DEATH in 1949 there has been some discussion
of whether his philosophical thinking remained in principle the same from
the Grundziige der Rechtsphilosophie (1914) to the Vorschule der Rechts-
philosophie (1948), or whether it underwent a drastic revolution or reform
after 1945 which could properly be designated as "a substantial change in his
point of view."' Some legal philosophers deny any and all development;2
others maintain that there was a decisive change. 3 The latter opinion is
particularly important in that it is the thesis of a significant and compre-
hensive study.4 The former view, however, which contests the suggestion
that any such change ever took place, can appeal to a no less profound
interpretation of Radbruch's legal philosophy. 5
As for the cause of this alleged revolution or reform we are referred not
to any inner transformation in Radbruch himself, but to two external ex-
periences: one in the realm of German political history, and the other in
the realm of the history of ideas. The first is that of National Socialist dic-
tatorship since 19336 and the Allied Occupation of Germany since 1945-
both insofar as they significantly affected German legal life. The second is
that of the rise of existentialist philosophy together with the renascence of
theology in German intellectual and spiritual life.
1. Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, The Legal Philosophy of
Gustav Radbruch, 6 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 457, 481 (1954). The interest of the
American reader in Radbruch's philosophy of law was first aroused by Anton-Hermann
Chroust in his penetrating article, The Philosophy of Law of Gustav Radbruch, 53 THE
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 23-45 (1944).
2. Cf., e.g., VALENTIN TOMBERO, DEGENERATION UND REGENERATION DER REcHTS-
WISSENSCHAFT 21 (1947).
3. Cf., e.g., KONRAD ZWEIGERT, VORWORT ZU RADBRUCHS EINFOHRUNG IN DIE
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 6 if. (9th ed., 1952).
4. FRITZ VON HIPPEL, GUSTAV RADBRUCH ALS RECHTSPHILOSOPHISCHER DENKER (1951).
5. KARL ENGISCH, GUSTAV RADBRUCH ALS REcHTSPHILOSOPH (1949), especially on
page 7: "Er hat seinen Relativismus nicht preisgegeben." ["He did not abandon his
relativism."]
6. FRITZ VON HIPPEL, op. cit. at 13, points out, however, that until the end of 1943,
that is, after his evil experiences with the National Socialist regime, Radbruch never
questioned the philosophical position he had held in 1932, the year in which appeared his
most famous work, the RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE, the final formulation of his legal philosophy.
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Three effects of these experiences on Radbruch's thinking are contended
for: first, the rejection of relativism and rationalism in legal philosophy with
a resultant turn toward the tradition of natural law; second, the formulation
of a concept of "Natur der Sache"* as a first principle of legal philosophy -
a formulation new to his thinking and independent of parallel developments
in others; third, the acknowledgment that the idea of material justice is
more important than the certainty or efficacy of the law, by which ac-
knowledgment he presumably found the starting point for a changed value
theory of law.
For evidence of this substantial transformation of Radbruch's philosophi-
cal "system" we are referred first to Radbruch's abandonment of his teaching
that there exists an unresolvable antinomy among justice, legal certainty,
and expediency; second, to his abandonment of a "methodological dualism"
in the law, basically determined by the separation of "is" and "ought"-
the basic doctrine peculiar to Neo-Kantian legal philosophy; third, to the
abandonment of his (logical) rationalism in favor of a (metaphysical) com-
mitment to value in terms of a deep faith - a commitment which supposedly
also indicates his rejection of a purely formal, "value-neutral," and legal-
technical conception of democracy in favor of a moral conception of a
democracy.
To conclude from all this a rupture in Radbruch's thinking seems natural
enough, especially since Radbruch himself gave occasion to such views by
certain utterances of his, such as the notes, first published by this writer in the
preface to the posthumous 4th edition of Radbruch's Rechtsphilosophie,7
which Radbruch had made for this edition. But as we interpret these re-
* The concept Natur der Sache, together with numerous derivatives such as sdchlich, zur
Sache, and Sachvernunft, is one of the central themes of this paper. Its adequate transla-
tion presents considerable difficulty. It seems to have been translated variously as, simply,
"nature of things," or as "essence of facts," or "of objects" or as combinations of these
terms. Since Wolf, like so many German writers, plays almost lyrically with the term
"Sache" in this paper, it seems best to render each occurrence of the word or one of its
derivatives as best befits the context, but to call attention to the German word in parentheses,
in order to alert the English reader to the theme-and-variation effect in the style of the
original. As for a literal translation of Natur der Sache, the translator suggests "The nature
of the objective situation." This would seem to render most closely the sense in which
Schiller used the phrase when he characterized Goethe as one who "always received the
law from the object and deduced from the Natur der Sache its rules." Radbruch himself,
citing Schiller, adds that "Natur der Sache is the choice of all who are making an effort
to lessen the crass dualism of 'is' and 'ought,' of reality and value, of all who look for the
reason in things." (Festschrift fiir Laun, 1948.) [Translator's note.]
7. RECHTSP91LOSOPHIE 11 ff. (4th ed., edited by Erik Wolf, 1950); also at 11 ff. of
5th ed., edited by Erik Wolf (1956). These two editions are subsequently cited as RPH 4
or RPH 5 respectively. The corresponding earlier editions are cited as RPH 1, RPH 2,
and RPH 3.
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marks we must not forget that Radbruch's posthumous papers also admit of
an a posteriori conclusion as to how he meant to work out these new thoughts
in detail.
Did Radbruch intend in this projected fourth edition to write a com-
pletely new philosophy of law? This he expressly denied.8  Furthermore,
he had already designated the edition of 1932 as his conclusive and final
word on the subject,9 even though the allegedly new ideas about the Natur
der Sache, the supremacy of the value of justice,10 and the acknowledgment
of "supra-positive norms" 11 were already affecting him.
Did he intend to revise the text? No, for he had provided that in the
event of his death a new edition should be issued without changes;' 2 and in
1948 he would not allow the publication of students' notes taken in his
seminar in legal philosophy except under the title of Vorschule der Rechts-
philosophie [Introduction to Legal Philosophy].
From this it follows that then as always he considered the Rechtsphilos-
ophie as he had formulated it in 1932 the final expression of his objective
views. By his choice of a title for the seminar notes he wanted to indicate
that he saw in them no more than a pedagogically expedient introduction to
the Rechtsphilosophie which would clarify the "development of his thinking."
Also, he himself wished to append an "epilogue" to his Rechtsphilosophie, in
order to explain the further development of its fundamental ideas- which
"nonetheless have maintained themselves."' 13 Never did Radbruch say that
he considered the Vorschule a substitute for his main work, or even an ad-
vance to a new level of his thought transcending the Rechtsphilosophie.
Hence the Vorschule is no more than a complementary introduction 14 pro-
viding a better understanding of the development of his philosophical ideas
and the postulates of legal policy derived from them.
This explanation of the true relation between the Rechtsphilosophie and
the Vorschule does not, of course, solve by itself the question of whether we
have in the Vorschule an example of revolution or evolution in Radbruch's
thinking. To decide this, we need to consider three underlying questions:
8. Id. at 7.
9. RPH 3 at vii.
10. Already in the Foreword to the 1932 edition of the Rechtsphilosophie Radbruch
stresses the "original significance" of this value called justice as well as its independence
of mere pragmatic purposefulness.
11. He does this already in his Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtssch5pfung, 4 ARCHIv FUR
SOZALWISSENSCHAFTEN UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE, Neue Folge, 355 ff. (1906).
12. Only supplemented by a "postscript" which he intended to write. Cf. RPH 5 at 7.
13. RPH 4 at 10.
14. See GIORGoo DEL VECCHIo, LEHRBUCH DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 294 (2nd ed.,
translated and with an introduction by F. Darmstaedter, 1951).
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The first question is: How did Radbruch understand himself? Did he
understand himself correctly when he designated the alleged "new" ideas as
a progressive elaboration rather than a correction of his previous thinking?
The second question is: Did Radbruch's critics after 1914 and 1932 under-
stand correctly the meaning contained in the basic theses of his Rechtsphi-
losophie? Are the traditional slogans about Radbruch's "relativism" and
"positivism" appropriate to begin with? The third question is: How do the
basic theses of Radbruch's legal philosophy appear in the light of his auto-
biographical work, Der innere Weg?15 For the cohesion-the objective
unity and the subjective wholeness-of his legal philosophy shows itself
throughout his literary as well as his philosophical works.
I
The question of how Radbruch understood himself as a legal phi-
losopher demands, if it is to be answered, first of all the consideration of the
pertinent autobiographical references. Tradition, 1 6 it soon becomes obvious,
is the source and nourishing soil of his spiritual nature; he needed to be
reverent, and he could raise his soul and that of others in the contemplation
of greatness.1 7 This innermost quality may sound paradoxical in a man who,
as a person and a thinker, frequently had to oppose and combat what his
own times considered to be in the best of tradition. It is less surprising, how-
ever, if one understands Radbruch's genuine spiritual kinship with Theodor
Fontane, who among the German poets of the nineteenth century stands out
for his skepticism and criticism of bourgeois cant, but who was at the same
time extremely fond of tradition and most ready to be reverential.' 8
What, then, was the tradition which Radbruch considered important
enough to pass on as an academician, to bear witness to as a writer, and to
cultivate as a human being? Briefly, it was the spiritual tradition of classical
humanism, a tradition which had grown weak politically, was hardly alive
socially, and had become almost extinct in the law. It was "In grateful
remembrance of the cultivation of humanistic education in the Liibeck
Katherineum," that Radbruch composed, during the war year of 1942, his
excellent essay on Cicero's Consolatio.19 He liked to remember that as a
15. DER INNERE WEG: AUFRISS MEINES LEBENS (1951), subsequently cited as IW.
16. Cf. especially 1W at 9 ff.; 12; 13 ff.; 25 if.
17. RADBRUCH, EINFiIHRUNG IN DIE REcHTSWISSENSCHAFT 256 (9th ed., 1952).
18. RADBRUCH, THEODOR FONTANE: ODER SKEPSIS UND GLAUBE (1946), subsequently
cited as FONTANE.
19. RADBRUCH, GESTALTEN UND GEDANKEN 208 if. (2nd ed., 1954).
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doctoral candidate in Berlin he had been greeted by the old criminologist
Berner with the opening words of Sallust's Bellum Catilinarum.2 0 As the
biographer of P. J. A. Feuerbach, Radbruch shared Feuerbach's frequently
expressed love of classical Latin. The idea of humanity (Humanitiit), which
became the motus animi continuus of Radbruch's legal philosophy, was con-
stantly nourished by the spirit and language of the classical Latin authors.2 1
He loved this humanitarian ideal in the Ciceronian tradition of classical
humanitas; and he rediscovered it in the humanistic heritage of the sixteenth
century. Accordingly, he felt himself particularly attracted as well as in-
debted to those spiritual leaders of the Western world who propagated and
ministered to this ideal during the eighteenth century: Montesquieu, Lessing,
and Goethe. Determined by such a fundamental outlook, he chose his main
topics both as a legal philosopher and as a criminal law theorist; and the
humanistic postulates of Voltaire, Beccaria, and Dr. Johnson became his
guides in the elaboration of detail. Everything he ever wrote was profoundly
influenced by this basic commitment as well as by his tenacious opposition
to the forces of inhumanity: his general ideas about human rights and crimes
against humanity; his accounts of human beings tormented, enslaved, and
deprived of all their rights; his incessant battle against the death penalty; his
intercession for the conscientious lawbreaker; his timely essays on criminal
abortion; his biography of Feuerbach; and his notes on Daumier's caricatures
of lawyers- all these seemingly unrelated topics are held together by Rad-
bruch's innermost urge to be "humane" in the sense of a (neo-) humanistic
ideal of life, personality, and culture. Resolutely he fought for this humanism,
and he spoke boldly of "rebarbarization" where he found it disowned. 22
On the strength of these views, he began as early as 1906 to conceive of
the existence of "supra-positive" norms.2 3 Later he extended his vision to its
practical application as, for instance, in the recognition of absolute human
rights. But this constitutes an organic "progress" rather than a radical "rev-
olution" in his legal philosophy. Karl Engisch is quite correct when he says:
"Substantial elements of his [later] teachings can be found in his early
works." 24
Radbruch understood his particular "intellectualism," just as he under-
stood his mission as thinker and writer, in terms of the eighteenth cen-
20. 1W at 77.
21. Cf., in this connection, VOM EDLEN GEISTE DER AUFKLXRUNG 23 if.; 49 ff. (1948);
Drei Strafrechtslehrbiicher des 19. Jahrhunderts, ROSENFELD FESTSCHRIFT 16 (1949).
22. Cf. Der Erziehungsgedanke im Strafwesen, HUNDERTJAHRFEER DER BADISCHEN
GEFANGENENFURSORGE 12 (1932).
23. See note 11, supra.
24. Op. cit. supra, note 5 at 11.
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tury version of classical humanitas. In that "bright faith in reason" 2 5 with
which he knew himself to be suffused, he found strong support as well as
much of his direction in the philosophy of Kant, and this despite the fact
that he himself defined his search after rationality and intelligibility as a
"resolute teleological rationalism" 26 inspired to some extent by Ihering. He
gladly and joyously concedes his bias for the "noble spirit of the Enlighten-
ment" 2 7 and its spontaneous and rational subservience to humanitarian ends
- a spirit animated by a trust in the innate goodness of man and, consequent-
ly, in the pedagogical power of secular schools and general education, and
by a high esteem for the knowledge and wisdom of life to be found in books.
Radbruch was an indefatigible collector and great lover of "literary mottoes."
Radbruch's conviction of the pre-eminence of logical problems within
legal philosophy and their superiority over methodological, systematic, onto-
logical, and even, in a specifically legal sense, "ethical" issues (such as the
"problem of freedom," which became a central problem in German idealism)
is grounded in his classical-humanistic understanding of the logos. His noetics
therefore are never affected by the formalism of psychologizing tendencies in-
herent in the logic of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century,
but always preserve that sense of objective-realistic rectitudo (developed dur-
ing the eighteenth century by Leibniz and Wolff along the lines already in-
dicated by Aristotle-St. Thomas) which seeks not merely to think "correctly"
but also to live "rightly" especially in the realm of thought. Hence Radbruch's
"rationalism" always has to be understood in terms of an active - and above
all, pedagogic - reason. His was a rationalism of intelligent guidance as
well as joyous reform, a rationalism, which, as he himself wrote as early as
1932 (that is, long before his alleged transition from rationalism to meta-
physics), "did not live in the faith that the universe divided by reason comes
out even."
28
From the beginning, Radbruch's rationalism was nondogmatic and self-
critical, determined, in the last analysis, by deeply emotional commitments 9
- an incessant search for "wisdom,"' 30 or, as his colleague Max Ernst Mayer
25. ROSENFELD FESTSCHRIFT 27, cited in note 21, supra.
26. This idea can already be found in RPH 1 at 19 and 297, and in the ROSENFELD
FESTSCHRIFT at 27. Only in GERECHTIGKEIT UND GNADE (RPH 4 at 337 ff.), that is,
in the year 1949, this idea is restricted by the notion of contingency and mercy.
27. See note 21, supra.
28. RPH 3 at viii.
29. Already at an early stage of his intellectual development Radbruch fully understood
the close and dialetically necessary relationship between feeling and ratio. Cf. Vber das
Rechtsgefiihl, DIE, TAT 337 ff. (1914).
30. Cf. R. BUCHWALD in the Postscript (Nachwort) to GESTALTEN UND GEDANKEN 206
(2nd ed., 1954).
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put it, a willingness to "undertake wisdom's risk."' 31 Hence it cannot be said
that the lasting insight into the identity of philosophy and wisdom first came
to Radbruch when as an old man he was in the position of a "sage" or "elder
statesman of philosophy."
Even Radbruch's positivistic approach to law was essentially rooted in
humanistic traditions in that it always remained close to the classical notion
of "natura" as Leibniz, for ,instance, had understood it. An empiricism or
monism based on the physico-biological, mechanistic, or historico-psycho-
logical concept of "nature" had no attraction for him. In this he differed
radically from his teacher, Franz von Liszt. Even those of his studies and
investigations which deal with problems of legal psychology or legal history
fully confirm this. These studies resort to an "empiricism" of a totally differ-
ent kind, to a realism3 2 of the sort which philosophically had been demanded
by Husserl's motto, "Back to the facts!" (Zu den Sachen!), as well as by
Eugen Huber's reference to the "Realien des Rechts," - the "realities of the
law"- which became current among lawyers and legal philosophers.
Radbruch, indeed, once said that he owed his "intellectual schooling to
the Heidelberg of Jellinek, Windelband, Lask, Troeltsch, Gothein, and Max
Weber."3 3 But this professed allegiance to the Neo-Kantian school of Heidel-
berg - the influence of Rickert's methodological dualism, 34 transmitted
through Hermann Levy,3 5 can be detected in Radbruch as early as 1904 -
is by no means wholly irreconcilable with the "turn" toward an ontological
metaphysics which Radbruch took in his later legal philosophy. His desertion
of Stammler and Liszt in favor of Lask and Max Weber already shows, long
before the First World War, to what extent Radbruch's thinking, schooled
in Lask's idea of the "interrelatedness of methods," sought to achieve the
essential interconnectedness of "is" and "ought" in the law. As early as
1924, in his Material Determination of the Idea, he had abandoned the
strict dogma of the duality of "is" and "ought" typical of Neo-Kantianism; 3 6
he had become aware of an "existential" trend in his thinking, a trend, to be
sure, which must not be identified with certain "philosophical schools" of the
same name.3 7 Radbruch's empiricism and positivism - like his socialism
31. MAYER, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 1 (1922).
32. Cf. his DER GEIST DES ENGLIScHEN REcHTS 12 ff. (1946).
33. DER MENSCH IM RECHT 18 (1926).
34. RPH 1 (1914), Foreword.
35. IW at 85.
36. Cf. KANT-FESTSCHRIFT DER INTERNATIONALEN VEREINIOUNG FUR RECHTSPHILO-
SOPHIE 185; 190 (1924).
37. In a discussion with Karl Jaspers (cf. RPH 4 at 102, note 1) Radbruch referred to
his relativism as existentialism. Cf. ERICH FECHNER, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 224, note 4
(1956).
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were rooted not in theories but in experiences, not in general platforms but
in concrete human models. More particularly, they were formed by Goethe's
metaphysical poetry and tested against Goethe's image of the world.
Intimately related to the "Visione Goethiana del mondo,"38 as well
as to his revival of certain tendencies common to the Stoa and the Enlighten-
ment,3 9 was Radbruch's notion of tolerance,40 which in his later years he saw
exemplified in the personality of Fontane. This notion determined not only
his attitude of open-mindedness toward everything, but also his constant
readiness to listen to others and to consider other viewpoints as valid. This
did not prevent him, however, from resolutely taking sides in questions of
personal value judgments, nor did it interfere with his vigorous independence
in matters political and pedagogical. It did prevent, however, the petrifica-
tion into dogmatism that is so often the result of a hasty effort to establish a
philosophical "system." Keeping in mind the basic Goethean tolerance ("not
readily to reject anything outright"), Radbruch wished always to do justice
to concrete historical changes and new spiritual or intellectual currents, but
without committing or changing his own philosophical position. His ever-
present readiness for self-criticism without any yielding of fundamental
principles ideally disposed his mind for a constant broadening and deepening
of his intellectual attitudes. This inner urge to become ever more conscious
of himself, was, to be sure, strongly stimulated but never deflected from its
path by the events of 1914, 1933, and 1945.
Radbruch's ability to appraise himself correctly was manifest not
only in his determined rejection of everything essentially alien to his thinking,
but also in his sure instinct for choosing trends with which he could be in
accord. These two aspects of his behavior originated in a basic and un-
changing attitude that determined his whole way of life, although their con-
crete realization - in accordance with the Katpbq of the rixr/ of any given
"situation"- at times necessitated certain shifts in emphasis as well as in
the mode of expression.
Thus early in his career he was already keeping himself apart from
the legal philosophies current in his time,4 1 especially from that type of legal
38. Cf. Radbruch, II Diritto nella Visione Goethiana del Mondo, 20 RIVISTA INTER-
NAZIONALE DI FTLOSo,'rA DEL DIRITTO, folios 4 and 5 (1940).
39. In his Verdeutschter Cicero: Zu Johann v. Schwarzenbergs Offizien-tbersetzung,
35 ARcHiv riiR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 154 (1940), Radbruch extols the
exemplary "tolerant and nonfanatical attitude of Cicero."
40. This notion of "tolerance" can already be found in RPH I at 28, and in Franz v.
Liszts Strafrechtslehrbuch, DEUTSCHE LITERATURZEITUNG, col. 683 ff. (1919).
41. He flatly refused to discuss the jurisprudential literature of his time. Cf. RPH 3
at xiii.
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philosophy which had hardened into a "professional discipline." He never
had any ambition to play an authoritative role in these schools, much less the
leading one. 42 Philosophers and philosophical arguments had increasingly
less effect on him the more they remained tied to professionalism or, worse,
academicism.
He was attracted only by the kind of thought that is naturally akin to
poetic thought. This does not imply, however, that he was tending toward
that sort of "esthetic philosophy" which, as a rule, turns into a superficial
cultural prattle engaged in by certain "philosophers of life" ("Lebensphilo-
sophen"). His concern was rather with that supreme intellectual enterprise
in which philosophy and art, thought and poetry, are all bound up to-
gether. Radbruch's aim was not to achieve an "esthetic science," but to
transform science into art - into a concrete, comprehensive understanding of
genuine and genuinely formed "Gestalt-perception."' 4 3 But while aiming for
this supreme goal, Radbruch's thinking always remained disciplined and scru-
pulously scientific. If we are to understand the dominant "esthetic factor" in
his philosophical writings as he himself understood it, we must not mis-
interpret it as mere incidental ornamentation or, even worse, simply as
humanistic snobbery. The wellspring of his thinking, including his legal
philosophical thinking, was the poet's view of life. This would also explain
his disdain for polemical discussions, 44 as well as his constant effort to find
a poetic witness to his thoughts. The many "mottoes" which preface his
books or the various chapters of his books; the notes and references full of
literary gleanings; his collection, begun early in life, of literary aphorisms
touching on legal philosophy- all this was to him no fancy game to while
away idle hours, but a serious effort to secure for himself and others the
"iron ration" necessary for the preservation of spiritual and intellectual life.
It is here that we can find the key to some of the bases of his legal ideas.45
All this should also explain Radbruch's rejection of the demand for a
closed legal philosophical system.4 6 Radbruch, who had been thoroughly
trained in methodology by Franz von Liszt, was only too conscious of the
methodological relativism to which all juridical systematizations sooner or
later must succumb. Hence he denied that a genuine and workable answer
to legal philosophical problems could be derived from a purely "systematic
42. Cf. Anton-Hermann Chroust, op. cit. supra, note 1 at 23.
43. Cf. the competent analysis of KARL ENGISCH, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 1 ff.
44. Cf. note 41, supra.
45. Cf. here RADBRUCH, KLEINES RECHTSBREVIER, SPRUCHBUCH FUR ANSELM, edited
after Radbruch's death by Fritz von Hippel (1954).
46. Cf. Anton-Hermann Chroust, op. cit. supra, note 1 at 41.
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solution." He was attracted to the "system of criminal law" not so much
because of the homogeneity of the basic plan as because of the almost infinite
variety of aspects in the overall picture.4 7 Rather than attempt to harmonize
dialectical tensions and conflicts, he directed his analytical efforts to demon-
strating the unresolvable antinomy present in every problem. Such an "anti-
nomic" gave proper and ample scope for the intrinsic experiences underlying
his own thinking, but it did not result in the "quest for a system." 48 His
was a quest for the clarification of problems, especially the ambivalence and
divergence of the possible methods of attack. This intellectual attitude
cemented his legal philosophy to the truly historical point of view 49
(Geschichtlichkeit) which never concentrates on the "solution" of problems,
or on "systematic concepts," but on insights into "problem constellations"
and "problem complexes" and, hence, on "living types." 50  When con-
fronted with a choice, he always addressed himself to the particular situation
-spoke, as it were, from within the situation -without ever being dis-
tracted by pragmatic concerns from what he considered essential. This
ability to speak from "within" as well as from "without" demanded a sure
feeling for the "actual," especially if he wished to preserve certain "objective,"
i.e., lasting and essential values. Such values he never ignored. On the con-
trary, his whole approach stood in their service. For this reason his phil-
osophical thinking after 1945 did indeed take the altered situation and
"problem constellation" into account. But this ability and readiness "to do
justice to a new situation" never made him in the least unfaithful to his
previous focus of philosophical concern. In the years between 1914 and
1932, his mind displayed the same disciplined adaptability. This may be
gathered from the fact that he declared the third edition of the Rechtsphi-
losophie to be "an entirely new book,"' 51 something, incidentally, he did not
do with any of his post-1945 writings.
Endowed with a soberly critical mind, Radbruch did not approve of the
pseudo-idealistic conception of legal philosophy that sees in it the "crowning
glory" of all jurisprudence - that fraudulent intellectual attitude which ex-
pects from legal philosophy only the confirmation of what already has been
attained in some other way, or, still worse, tries, through the "idealization"
of current legal doctrines and practices, to remove once and for all both legal
47. Cf. KARL ENGISCH, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 3.
48. FRITZ VON HiPPEL, op. cit. supra, note 4 at 13ff.
49. Cf. Anton-Hermann Chroust, op. cit. supra, note 1 at 33.
50. KARL ENGISCH, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 4, has pointed out the affinity of Radbruch's
ideas with those of Dilthey. Edward Spranger also influenced Radbruch.
51. RPH 3 at vii.
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philosophy and jurisprudence from the ambit of intelligent criticism. In his
legal philosophy Radbruch did not intend to furnish premature or ready-
made answers: he was always patiently asking questions. Radbruch referred
to this "method" by the frequently misunderstood word, "relativism, '
through which he intended not only to challenge the unwarranted self-assur-
ance of certain jurists,52 but also to resist their inclination constantly to
justify themselves. 53 He devised his antinomic conception of law primarily
in order to create a constant stimulus to repeated testing and analytical re-
evaluation. Only with a "bad conscience," he once said, can a man be a
systematic jurist; only through "critical unrest" can a man of the law achieve
a "clear conscience."
One of the earliest and, at the same time, most consistent of Rad-
bruch's tendencies was his social or, better perhaps, his society-reforming im-
pulse. It accounted for the decidedly practical bent in his legal philosophy.
Through it he remained in close touch with what the Germans of the 'twenties
called "'sociology": a total and cohesive scientific attitude toward social factors
and their overall effects on the intellectual life.
This sociological tendency of his became manifest in the realization, come
by early in his career, of the social responsibility of the academician. It also
appeared in his insistence that jurisprudence adjust to and extend into socio-
political thinking. In accordance with this tendency, he joined the sociolog-
ical school of criminal law founded by Franz von Liszt. All his life Radbruch
pursued von Liszt's goal of a truly social administration of criminal law,
especially during his term as Minister of Justice of the German Federal Re-
public (1921-1922 and 1923), when he was working out the plan for a
new German criminal code.
This social or sociological tendency of Radbruch explains also his inclina-
tion, stimulated by the influence of Max Weber, 54 to pay attention to the
complexity of empirical facts, a complexity which early in his career 55 he
already understood as "the nature of the objective situation" (Natur der
Sache).
52. Against this tendency, cf. Radbruch, Juristen-b5se Christen, 9 DIE ARGONAUTEN
(1916).
53. Radbruch, Vier lose Blatter ftir Ricarda Huch, 9 DIE SAMMLUNG 355 ff. (1954):
"skeptische Worte fiber die Macht des Rechts"; "Fragwiirdigkeit aller Rechtspflege."
["skeptical words concerning the effectiveness of law"; "questionable aspects of the law."]
54. As to Radbruch's contacts with Max Weber, cf. IW at 83 if.; 88.
55. DER HANDLUNGSBEGRIFF 95 (1903); RECHTSIDEE UND RECHTSSTOFF 190 (1924):
"vor allem aber erleuchtet die gewonnene Einsicht das Schlagwort von der 'Natur der
Sache' " ["the motto, 'the nature of the thing,' more than anything else helps to clarify the
newly gained insight"]; La natura della cosa, RiVISTA INTERNATIONALE Di FILOSOFIA DEL
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Radbruch's social inclinations also impelled him, despite his basically con-
templative nature, to engage in political activity. Not "anti-worldly-wise gen-
eralities," he once wrote,5 6 "but the pressing political questions of the day"
had determined the basic themes of Feuerbach's early writings on legal phi-
losophy. The same is true of Radbruch himself. Following Max Weber, he
tried to draw clear distinctions between science and politics, between "value-
relating" and "evaluating" thinking. Especially his Kulturlehre des Sozia-
lismus (1922) bears witness to his effort to make a sharp distinction be-
tween arguments based on political or partisan considerations and scientifi-
cally grounded arguments or demonstrations. But despite his pronounced
political tendencies and interests, he never tried to elaborate his socialistic
convictions- Radbruch was a lifelong Social Democrat- into a legal phi-
losophy. On the contrary, his philosophical relativism, like his methodological
dualism, stood in sharp contrast both to the theory of early Marxism and to
the official interpretation of history and of law to which the leaders of the
German Social-Democratic movement adhered.5 7 The political motivation
of Radbruch's philosophical thinking was not socialistic ideology but social
humanism and humanitarianism (Humanitiit).58 The political meaning of
his legal philosophy climaxed in the postulate that the truly intellectual man
must accept social responsibility- a readiness which must stand the test
of active citizenship. 5 9
Not only after 1933, but already in his earliest legal and philosophical
work,60 Radbruch unmistakably called for a material political and social
ethics;6 1 he did so with renewed emphasis in his essay, "Zur Philosophie
dieses Krieges," which he composed in 1917 under the immediate impressions
of his own experiences as a soldier in the German army during World War I.
In the final analysis, the reason his allegedly neutral, and in a way formal-
istic, value relativism became so important and even indispensable to him,
despite objectively justifiable objections, was that he saw in it a political
ethos: "the intellectual presupposition of a true democracy." 6 2 For by de-
DIRITTO (1941); Die Natur der Sache als juristische Denkform, LAUN-FESTSCHRIFT 157-
176 (1948).
56. P. J. A. FEUERBACH, EIN JURISTENLEBEN 24 (2nd ed., ed. Erik Wolf, 1956).
57. See what Radbruch himself had to say about this in his postscript to the 3rd edition
of his KULTURLEHRE DES SOZIALISMUS (1949).
58. IW at 109: "Es nicht besser haben wollen als andere." ["Not to wish to have it
better than other people."]
59. REPUBLIKANISCHE PFLICHTENLEHRE (1928).
60. Rechtswissenschaft als Rechtssch5pfung, 4 ARCisv FuR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT UND
SOZIALPOLITIK 355 ff. (1905).
61. This was correctly pointed out by Anton-Hermann Chroust, op. cit. supra, note 1
at 28: "The ultimate grounds for his intellectual attitude are primarily moral."
62. RPH 3 at viii. Cf. Anton-Hermann Chroust, loc. cit.
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mocracy he did not mean a sort of game played in a spirit of neutral in-
difference toward the state in accordance with certain formal rules. Rather,
influenced on one level by Swiss and English models, and, on a deeper level,
by the inborn feeling for "freedom within order" traditional among the cit-
izens of the Free Hanseatic City of Liibeck, he saw democracy as a material
ordering of social life, experienced as an organic and living "integration"
and not merely written as a formal "constitution." This is also why he in-
sisted that there exists a "system of civic and moral duties consonant with a
republican form of government," an idea which he advanced in 1928 in a
memorial speech before a plenary session of the German Reichstag. 6 3 It was
on the same occasion that he also stressed the primacy of the idea of justice
over mere utility - a notion which he subsequently emphasized still more -
as well as the idea of inviolable human rights as the ultimate standard and
criterion of all positive laws.6 4
At that time he had also begun to stress the value of civic instruction in
the schools. The pedagogical tendency in all his speeches and writings, of
which this attempt at educational reform is but a single example, constitutes
in itself one of the most important characteristics of his philosophical thinking.
He aimed at nothing less than a vital strengthening of the feeling for law, 6 5
especially since he was sadly aware of the fact that many of his countrymen
had no understanding whatever of the moral strength inherent in an organ-
ically evolved legal order. This is also the reason why, in good Platonic
fashion, he always connected the objective idea of justice with the subjective
notion of individual righteousness. He was never enough the Kantian to de-
clare a purely inner-subjective "attitude-ethics" adequate to cope with a
moral issue. The contrast between the formal and the material aspect of
law that played an important role in Radbruch's early legal philosophy has
often been seized upon to maintain that his concept of justice underwent a
revolutionary change from an ethics of "pure conscience and duty" to a
social ethics based on material values. It should be borne in mind, however,
that this contrast never had any didactic meaning for Radbruch himself. In
1934 he wrote in his own copy of the Rechtsphilosophie: "Justice, not ex-
pediency, [is] the ideal of the law." 6 6 This, however, was not for him a new
idea that would have necessitated a basic change in his thinking on the sub-
ject. He wrote it apropos of the critical sermon delivered by Archbishop
Gr6ber of Freiburg against the killing off of the mentally ill by command of
63. See note 59 supra.
64. REPUBLIKANISCHE PFLICHTENLEHRE 8 (1928).
65. Id. at 7.
66. RPH 5 at 124, note 1.
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the Nazi authorities, and wished only to take advantage of this particular
concrete situation (Lage) to give an emphatic expression to what had long
been his general (zur Sache) views.
Imbued from his youth with the humanistic ideal of the "right Vrada
' '6 7
- which meant to him not a "liberal education" in the traditional bourgeois
sense, much less that pseudo-education that enables some people "to talk a
little bit about everything," but rather a training for intellectual self-reliance
through properly guided reading and correct thinking - Radbruch placed
his learned writings completely at the service of genuine human culture and
the education of civilized mankind. Accordingly, in his philosophical or legal
writings, he did not care about devising a social cosmos harmoniously con-
structed and consistent throughout, in which "cultured people" could find
an affirmation of their values and a corresponding peace of mind. What he
cared about was the cultural and intellectual needs of his students and his
readers. Thus right after both wars - in 1918-1968 as well as in 1945-4769
- he addressed to young students a "philosophical reminder" as to the
essence of the factual situation (zur Sache), projected into the existential sit-
uation (Lage) of total demoralization and of a vast spiritual, intellectual, and
ethical dearth spreading out in all directions. He was a teacher in times of
dearth, such as the times demanded. Taking as his model what seemed to
him the finest poetic perception of a genuine educational community for the
development of true human beings, namely, the idea of the "pedagogical
province" in Goethe's Wilhelm Meister,70 Radbruch the educator, who was
forever concerned with the right ethos in the right place and at the right
time, always discussed only what was adequate to that particular place and
that particular time, and was therefore always adequate to "the nature of
the objective situation" (Natur der Sache).
II
Radbruch's philosophical thinking, embodying as it does this pedagogical
aspiration, has received much sharp criticism as well as admiring recognition.
67. IW at 27 ff.
68. IHR JUNGEN JURISTEN (1919).
69. FUNF MINUTEN RECHTSPEILOSOPHIE (1945).
70. Wilhelm Meisters Sozialistische Sendung, GESTALTEN UND GEDANKEN 84 ff.
(2nd ed., 1954). These ideas were first conceived in 1916, and formulated for the first
time in 1919, in 8 LoGos 152 (1919). They were the basis of a lecture given by Radbruch
in Oxford in 1936.
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This is not the place to go into these criticisms at length. Some have
lost their meaning through Radbruch's critiques of his own work; others
have been outmoded by historical, political, and ideological developments.
A few remarks are appropriate, however, concerning the general tenor of
these criticisms.
Insofar as his critics have been motivated by ideological presupposi-
tions, they have often either read into Radbruch's thought tendencies which
were not there, or have oversimplified his legal philosophy in terms of what-
ever principle they believed could be most effectively contrasted with their
own positions. By these means Radbruch's legal philosophy has been pressed
into such formulae as "systematic relativism," "materialistic positivism," or
"rationalism of the Enlightenment." Such contrived and absolutizing inter-
pretations of his thought prior to 1933 accord with equally contrived con-
tradictory interpretations of his thought after 1945. But they easily give rise
to a serious misunderstanding of both periods through inattention to the im-
portant question of how Radbruch's philosophical thought developed. This
development, to be sure, is even today insufficiently clarified, because of the
wealth of the sources, scattered in newspaper and magazine articles, in
Festschriften, and in various anthologies.
The stereotyped political ideologies of our day have contributed much
to the establishment of this one-sided picture, as might be expected in view
of the sharp political contours the figure of Radbruch has taken on. He was
called an "opponent of the conservative and organic theory of the state," 7 1
an "individualist" ;72 he seemed "to reject" the Neo-Thomist system of natural
law,73 and he was labelled a theoretician engrossed in "one-dimensional
thinking, devoid of any understanding of social reality."' 74
But the hardening of philosophical terminology and systematization
into slogans also has a share in creating this picture of Radbruch, as false as
it is dismal. In a strange contradictio in adjecto, "absolute relativism" was
sometimes imputed to him.7 5 Sometimes his doctrine was called "relative
cynicism." 7 6 With a notable divergence of understanding, some saw in Rad-
71. Arthur Wegner, Uber den Geltungsbereich des staatlichen Strarechts, Beitrage zur
Strafrechtswissenschaft, 1 FESTOABE FUR R. FRANK 100, note 3 (1930).
72. JULIUS BINDER, PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS 289 (1926).
73. KARL PETRASCHEK, SYSTEM DER RnCITSPHILOSOPHIE 107 and 135 (1932).
74. ERICH KAUFMANN, KRITIK DER NEUKANTISCHEN RECHTSPHILOSOPHiE 66; 77, note
1 (1921).
75. Cf. ERNST VON HIPPEL, EINFUHRUNO IN DIE RECHTSTHEORIE 99 (4th ed., 1955),
whose observations are in point.
76. LEONARD NELSON, DIR RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT OHNE RECHT 130 (1917).
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bruch's relativism a "sophistical skepticism" 7 7 or plain "skepticism";78 others
saw in it the expression of a "spirit turned profoundly uncreative,"7 9 or a
"weak and wretched philosophy," 8 0 while others, again, emphasized its spirit
of utter "resignation. s"8 1 On the one hand Radbruch's way of thinking was
supposed to be a manifestation of a "juristic positivism" ;82 on the other,
it was allegedly declaratory of an intellectualistic "rationalism," " 3 or of an
"intellectually exhausted" s 4 subjectivism.8 5 The same standpoint of Rad-
bruch which was criticized by many as being quietistic,8 6 or, in fact, as
pure "historicism," 8 7 seemed to others the token of "the revolutionary per
se." 8 8 On the whole, even those readers who had some intellectual kinship
with Radbruch's thought found it necessary to point out in him "a despair
of all ethics, a fateful denial of any possibility that legal or political problems
admit of a scientific solution."'8 9 Almost all these critics referred to the same
two statements in Radbruch's Rechtsphilosophie: one to the effect that values
are not capable of cognition (Erkenntnis), that is, of rational comprehension
through reason, but only of adherence (Bekenntnis) in terms of commitment
and faith; and another to the effect that there is no possibility of scientific
proof for the validity of value judgments.
Radbruch, to be sure, made it easy for his critics from the very be-
ginning. His chosen term, "relativism," in addition to being ambiguous, had
something of the character of a slogan. Indeed, he seems to have chosen the
term for these very qualities. At any rate, by choosing it he more or less in-
vited the general misunderstanding which soon materialized in phrases like
"denial of all values," "cultural decadence," and plain "nihilism." In its
strictly philosophical sense, too, the word met with justifiable objections. If
77. KARL JASPERS, VERNUNFT UND EXISTENZ 72 (1935).
78. CARL J. FRIEDRICH, DIE PHILOSOPHIE DES REGHTS IN HISTORISCHER PERSPEKTIVE
104 (1955).
79. KARL LARENZ, REGHTS- UND STAATSPHILOSOPHIE DER GEGENWART 76 (2nd ed.,
1935).
80. RUDOLPH STAMMLER, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE: DAS GESAMTE DEUTSCHE REGHTS 19
(1932).
81. 2 GUSTAV BOEHMER, DIE GRUNDLAGEN DER BURGERLICHEN RECHTSORDNUNG, part
1, 147 ff. (1951).
82. HELMUT COING, GRUNDZUGE DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 96 (1950).
83. Cf. KARL LARENZ, op. cit. supra, note 79 at 67.
84. AUGUST HEGLER, 4 MONATSCHRIFT FUR KRIMINALPSYCHOLOGIE 347 (1907/8).
85. CARL AUGUST EMGE, tIBER DAS GRUNDDOGMA DES RECHTSPHILOSOPHISCHEN
RELATIVISMUS 65 (1916); EDMUND MEZGER, SEIN UND SOLLEN IM RECHT 11 (1920).
86. See notes 85 and 81, supra.
87. WILHELM SAUER, SYSTEM DER REGHTS- UND STAATSPHILOSOPHIE 468 (2nd ed.,
1949).
88. ERNST VON HIPPEL, Op. cit. supra, note 75 at 107.
89. MAX SALOMON, GRUNDLEGUNG ZUR RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 53 (2nd ed., 1925).
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we remember, however, that for Radbruch word and object alike are derived
from the complex context of cultural history and sociology, then we may
realize wherein and to what extent these criticisms rest on misunderstanding.9 0
It is to his concern for context that Radbruch alluded when he used the term
"relativism." Because of this concern, he found more understanding and
more of a following among sociologists and historians (including those of the
law) than among philosophers and legal theoreticians. For the latter found
in his doctrine three fundamental errors, making it untenable in their eyes:91
a falsification of critical philosophy, an erroneous conception of dialectic, and
an abandonment of idealism. All three objections seem reducible to a con-
formism dictated by the traditional commitment of the German academic
community to Neo-Kantianism and Hegelianism. For what Radbruch had
in mind, however, the formulations of the "Heidelberg school" of Neo-
Kantian cultural idealism could be only a methodological point of departure,
never a final solution. It was his purpose to preclude any possible assertion
of a legal absolute on political, cultural, or religious grounds. Thus, his only
reason for declaring that "justice" must rest on relativism alone was his
desire to expunge all arbitrary, authoritarian systematic teleologies from the
law; his only reason for seeking "legal certainty" in positivism alone was his
desire to unmask every sort of hazy emotional pseudo-romanticism in politics
which conceals its true aim of power under the tactical disguise of fuzzy
absolutes; his only reason for demanding a rationalistic approach in the in-
terest of "expediency" was his desire to oppose "any irrational shrouding of
the ultimate contradictions and conflicts that demand a truly ultimate de-
cision."' 9 2 In taking this stand, he did not overlook the fact that such decisions
can be made only in the light of a concrete existential "situation," and that
the conditionedness of such a situation, its "fatal, antinomic compulsion," 9 3
as Radbruch puts it, neither determines one's choice nor relieves one from
making a choice.
III
If, from the vantage point thus far arrived at, we are to gain an insight
into the continuity of Radbruch's philosophical thinking; if, in other words,
90. Even in the United States stress is being laid upon the fact that "relativism" is not
a philosophical object but rather a philosophical method. Cf., for instance, Paul F. Schmidt,
Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 780; id. at
783, 788 (1955).
91. Cf. WILHELM SAUER, PHILOSOPHIE DER ZUKUNFT 68 ff. (1923).
92. RPH 3 at viii.
93. FRITZ VON HIPPEL, op. cit. supra, note 4 at 21.
NATURAL LAW FORUM
we are to give up misleading preconceptions about his alleged "antinomic
value-blindness" 94 prior to 1945, we must look at our interpretation of his
threefold fundamental position also in the light of Der innere Weg. It would
be a grave mistake to distinguish here between a "subjective" continuity in
Radbruch's self-evaluation and an "objective" discontinuity in his works: 9 5
the logos of the works is none other than the spirit of the thinker; and both
are the same, even where they do not always seem to say the same. To get
to the bottom of this, we shall try to formulate and explain three guiding
themes which have shaped and directed Radbruch's philosophical thinking
throughout, although we naturally cannot expect to find them perfectly ex-
pressed during the period of his legal apprenticeship. 96 It was his experience
of Goethe that gave them their form - that of a union of poetry and thought.
The first of these themes, which can be called the paradoxy of values,9 7
characterizes the negative aspect of Radbruch's nature, his need to reject,
counteract, turn away from things which he sensed did not properly belong
to him. This negative aspect had its roots in the "Schopenhauerian pessi-
mism" 98 of his early student days, in the then fashionable trend toward de-
cadence, fin-de-sidcle mood, 9 9 bohdme, pathos, and rhetorical Weltschmerz.
But it gradually became modified and restrained in the course of Radbruch's
efforts to comprehend the Goethe-Eckermann conversations and the gnomic
wisdom of Goethe's early period, and later through his discovery of the aged
Fontane, whose world-view seemed more and more acceptable to him, as he
testified over and over.
In the realm of legal philosophy, the problem of the paradoxy of values
became the foundation of Radbruch's relativism. The real aim of this rela-
tivism, therefore, was disillusionment, the unmasking of the "conventional
lies of civilized humanity."'10 0 If pursued in the interests of intellectual hon-
esty, it was called "denial of any preconceived values" (Wertfreiheit). Such
a denial has not the aspects of a "meaningless work";101 rather, it is declar-
atory of the vital realization that the never-ending moral tasks must forever
94. Id. at 35.
95. Id. at 99, note 54.
96. Cf. Marie Baum in her Postscript to DER INNERE WEG 209.
97. IW at 51.
98. IW at 52 and 85.
99. Ibid.
100. A statement of Max Nordau, quoted in IW at 52.
101. Arnold M. Rose, Sociology and the Study of Values, 7 BRITISH JOURNAL OF
SOCIoLOGY 1 (1956), in a most interesting manner shows how Anglo-American philosophers
have overcome the various forms of "value indifferentism" (W. C. Sumner). Cf. the
works of W. F. Ogburg, K. Mannheim, and especially Robert S. Lynd, KNOWLEDGE FOR
WHAT? (1939).
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be carried on. This, in turn, requires a merciless debunking of any pharisaical
"playing at virtuousness"' 1 2 in order to clear the way for the regeneration of
a genuine ethos. By demolishing the facade of pseudo-justice that had been
erected by nineteenth century German idealism, relativism made room for a
new approach to objective justice (Sachgerechtigkeit), a justice, that is, which
through the use of empirical, social, and practical data, clarified by an in-
telligent realism (Sachvernunft), would recognize in the realm of juris-
prudence the claims of what Radbruch's friend, Hermann Kantorowicz,
characterized as the "free-law movement." 10 3
"Because the existential relationship is firmer than an ideal relationship
can ever be,"'1 4 Radbruch was unable to regard the current repristinations
of idealism as a step in overcoming the "problematical nature of the law."' 0 5
Aware of the paradoxy of values, he soon realized the dangers of premature
crystallization of values and value positions into absolutes. 10 6 He also realized
that all legal ideologies inferred from such "generalized" values had no
binding force whatever. To this premature crystallization he opposed his
"relativism," which was intended not as a limitation on knowledge (Erkennt-
nis), but as a "road sign" pointing the only way to true knowledge. 10 7 For
Radbruch, relativism was simply a passageway, a transition, a sort of tran-
scendens necessary to overcome those interpretations of life and law that had
prematurely and uncritically crystallized into so-called philosophical systems.
Radbruch's philosophical analysis of the typological doctrines current in cer-
tain historico-sociological or anthropological schools of his own time did not
serve to confirm them, but rather, by demonstrating their limitations and the
relativity of their assertions or actions, to call them into question. But Rad-
bruch's relativism was much more than a "logical method" or a sociological
criterion. It was an "experience of the psyche," which compelled the phi-
losopher "to work out his own legal philosophy"' 0 8 in the light of the ever
vexatious "paradoxy of values" and the concomitant "antinomic of the law."
Such an intellectual attitude could lead no further than the discovery and
exposition of fundamental problems and issues. Hence Radbruch was justi-
fied in saying that his philosophical thought was spiritual action, that it was
accomplished in the debate between attacking thesis and defending anti-
102. FONTANE 57.
103. IW at 96 ff.
104. 1W at 135.
105. RPH 5 at 99 ff.; EINFUHRUNO 194 ff. (9th ed.); VORSCHULE.
106. This was stressed already in RPH 1 at 95; RPH 3 at 54. See also FRITZ VON HIPPEL,
op. cit. supra, note 4 at 20 if.
107. Cf. RPH 3 at 10.
108. 1W at 51.
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thesis,10 9 and that it taught the "how" rather than the "what" of philoso-
phizing about the law.110
The second guiding theme which should establish the continuity of
his thinking may be called "objective reason" (Sachvernunft). It character-
izes the positive side of Radbruch's nature: his need to affirm, accept, feel
enthusiasm, make himself accessible, and remain capable of further intellectual
and spiritual growth. Here again the roots reach back to early personal ex-
perience, this time to his contacts with the reformatory optimism of Franz
von Liszt, an optimism which became manifest in Radbruch's readiness for
revaluation of social values"' while a young Privatdozent in Heidelberg. But
the Goethean insight 1 2 into the mysterious connection between truth and
fruitfulness quickly imposed a discipline on this "social radicalism." Con-
comitantly, the one-sidedly logical causalism characteristic of his early
thought gradually ripened into a realism which paved the way for that wis-
dom of Radbruch's old age which would reverently let all things be what
they are.1 13
In the field of legal philosophy, this road led from rational positivism
(methodological dualism) to a realistic ethics of doing what socially had to
be done. Especially after Radbruch (in 1935) had become acquainted with
English law, 1 14 he began to consider the realistic rationale (sachliche Ver-
nunft) in the law to be "the union of eudaemonistic and ethical conduct of
life." 115 This personal experience with English law led him to the concept
of the Natur der Sache. This concept he conceived as providing a counter-
poise for the relativism of ideologies so that the intellect might be "cleansed"
by relativism from all unwarranted value-preferences, and still remain "ob-
jective" (sac/dich). In sum, it was to get to the ground of all things and
hence to the essence (Sache) itself, which, in law as well as elsewhere, is the
true "ground of all things." It is toward this ground that Radbruch's intellect
was traveling ever since his early works on the criminal law. For "act" and
109. 1W at 73.
110. RPH 3 at viii.
11I. Cf. here Radbruch's observations in FONTANE 52.
112. As regards Radbruch's interpretation of Goethe, see GESTALTEN UND GEDANKEN
9-13. The impact which Goethe's Weltanschauung had on Radbruch's whole life is made
clear in 1W at 41.
113. Cf. here especially the first excursus to his essay on "'die Natur der Sache," LAUN-
FESTSCHRIFT 164 ff.
114. "Auf Grund des Rechtslebens und der Natur der Sache" ("On the basis of the
whole legal reality and the 'nature' [essence] of the thing") the English people both create
law and decide legal issues. This is Radbruch's view of English law. Cf. DER GEIST
DES ENGLIScHEN RECHTS 11 (1946).
115. 1W at 186: "Happiness and fairness."
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"causation" as used in criminal law have to do with the "ground" of this
real "thing" (Sache) called "crime." Ever since these early works, he was
seeking to grasp the Natur der Sache as the basic concept not only of legal
philosophy but of all social philosophy. This thought, too, lies at the bottom
of his socialist doctrines. Socialism, as Radbruch understood and experienced
it, meant that kind of mental attitude which considers the "social problem"
with utmost seriousness, 116 and hence never avoids the basic question of
whether or not "the social" constitutes one of the fundamentals of human
existence, and if so, how.
With this insight Radbruch had reached at an early stage and on a pro-
found level that galaxy of problems which have assumed especial importance
today on account of contemporary efforts to devise a new legal ontology. For
this reason, if for no other, even Radbruch's turning toward philosophical
"existentialism" was not an indication of a revolution in his thinking, but
rather an indication of its organic evolution.
The third guiding theme is presented by the main concern of Rad-
bruch's later years: The Belief of the Unbeliever.11 7 Here we meet the ens
humanum of Radbruch's philosophical work, that aspect which properly
justifies our thema probandum. It is here that Radbruch's thinking extended
past the finite, past the historical existence of man with his perpetual affirma-
tions and negations; it is here that his two fundamental doctrines, relativism
and objective reason (Sachvernunft), were united; and it is here that we can
glimpse the genuine inner continuity of his legal philosophy.
Radbruch, it is to be noted, had grown up "without any relationship to
religion." 118 We know that after his confirmation as a Lutheran (which he
inwardly rejected as bourgeois convention)" 9 he took no part in the activ-
ities of any church. He, the lover of communal life, never had the experience
of Christian community. At the same time he instinctively rejected the sub-
stitute offered by sectarianism. Yet he had an intuitive awareness of the
nature of religious reality. Beginning with a period of prayerful asceticism as
a child 12 0 and with his esthetic yearning as a youth for the beauty of liturgi-
cal worship, through the lasting impression made on him as a student by the
earnestness of Sohm's confession of faith,' 2 ' down to his own conscientious
116. Cf. here also Vom individualistischen zum sozialen Recht, HANSEATISCHE RECHTS-
UND GERICHTSZEITUNO (Aug./Sept. 1930); IW at 54.
117. Formulated by Marie Baum, who wrote the Postscript to DER INNERE WEG. Cf.
1W at 211.
118. IW at 23.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. IW at 45 ff.
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efforts to understand his part in the war in religious terms, 122 and to his
attempts at a religious articulation of socialistic youth dedication cere-
monies1 23- all the time Radbruch sought seriously and honestly for God.
And with his struggle to achieve a "religious philosophy of law,"' 2 4
Radbruch the relativist gave scope to theological questions. In his Rechts-
philosophie he accorded an independent place among his value-axioms to the
"value-conquering" religious attitude of "love without regard to the worth
or worthlessness of what is loved," thereby preserving for theology its own
place alongside the philosophical and empirical disciplines, at a time when
theology's "idealistic" opponents denied that any theological problem in law
could even be discussed scientifically.
The "hidden yearning for religion"' 25 of Goethe and Fontane, which
Radbruch reverently brought to light in one of his few books, was to him
a possible key to the reconciliation of Christianity and socialism. 12 6 Of
course, he was strengthened in this attitude by the experiences of the renewed
Kulturkampf which set in after 1933.127 But even this alleged "transforma-
tion"- today interpreted by some as a "turn toward Neo-Thomist natural
law"'12 8 - is fully consistent with Radbruch's earlier thinking. Even if it took
the impressive horrors of the War and of Nazi dictatorship to make him
consider seriously a conversion to the Roman Catholic Church,12 9 he had
ever since his early student days an appreciation of the "beauty of the
Catholic faith and worship."' 30 With advancing years, his interest in theo-
logical questions increased. The humanist in him, if nothing else, turned
away from the Lutheran doctrine of sola gratia toward the objective natural
law concept of scholasticism; 131 and with the last sentence of his farewell
address to his students he professed the "anima naturaliter christiana."'
1 32
To be sure, Radbruch's commitment to natural theology was influenced by
his aversion to dogma in the Christian church. This, too, attests his "belief of
122. IW at 107 and 129.
123. IW at 179.
124. Two drafts by G. Radbruch and P. Tillich in 1919. Cf. IW at 130.
125. Cf. FONTANE 10 ff.
126. IW at 179 ff.
127. IW at 179 and at 210 ff.
128. Cf. ERICH FECHNER, Op. cit. supra, note 37 at 211, note 44.
129. Cf. IW at 34.
130. Ibid.
131. IW at 188. Marie Baum, in her Postscript to DER INNERE WEG 208, maintains
that Radbruch rejected the Protestant-Lutheran doctrine of sola gratia: "Humanist durch
und durch [verweigerte er] dem sols gratia die Nachfolge ...... ("Devoted humanist that
he was, [he refused] allegiance to the sola gratia [doctrine].")
132. RPH 5 at 77.
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the unbeliever."' 1 33 In a way he lived a "hidden Christianity-in-sub-
stance." 1
34
Not until we have gained this insight into the innermost core of his
existence, of which only his caritas sent rays to reach the outside world, can
we properly understand the singleness of his dialectical nature and justly eval-
uate his antinomic legal thinking. Viewed in this light, Radbruch's relativism
is but a reference to the provisional nature of all human law- an indict-
ment of any self-justification of the law through self-serving absolutist
ideologies.
Radbruch's legal philosophy remains a warning to which we cannot shut
our ears, a warning to be sparing with our assertions about the nature and
substance of justice. It calls out to every legal thinker that he must retain
the status of a questioner, forever restless, never retreating into himself or
losing touch with others, but persisting in the belief that even a science
which knows no more of true justice than to show up the limitations of those
who say they know it well, stands high in the sight of Him whose mercy ele-
vates and makes perfect all human justice.
(Translated by MARIANNE COWAN)
133. IW at 188.
134. In a letter written while serving in the German army in 1916, and addressed to his
daughter, Radbruch stated: "Es gibt zum letzten Ende nur Gott und die Secle." ["In the
final analysis there is nothing but God and the soul."] IW at 129.
